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COMMENT

At the Altar of Autonomy:
The Dangerous Territory of
Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach'
ANDREA BETH OTTt
not if
[L]iberty is only implicated if others deprive me of choice,
2
they simply fail to help me or fail to get out of my way.
INTRODUCTION

Frank Burroughs watched his vibrant, teenage
daughter suffer and waste away from a deadly form of head
and neck cancer. Abigail was being treated at the world-

1. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
t J.D. Candidate, University at Buffalo Law School, 2010; Ph.D. Candidate,
University at Buffalo Department of Philosophy, 2009. I would like to thank
first and foremost the editors of the Buffalo Law Review, especially Amy C.
Frisch, Editor-in-Chief, for her keen eye and support throughout this process. A
special thank you to my Note & Comment Editor, Deanne Michelle Jeffries. I
owe a great deal to Professors Sheila R. Shulman and Anthony H. Szczygiel
whose courses and conversations sparked my interest in health law and to
Professor Charles Patrick Ewing for his continual guidance. And finally, this
Comment would not have come to fruition without the encouragement of my
family and Nathan A. Heberlig.
2. CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 51

(2007).
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class Johns Hopkins University, but to no avail. Limited to
conventional treatments and the time in which to
administer them running out, Abigail desperately tried to
get access to an experimental drug, Erbitux, not yet
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Abigail did not get access to Erbitux 3 and passed away.
Frank Burroughs listened to the stories of other families
whose children and spouses suffered a fate similar to that of
Abigail, along with their frustration with an often decadelong drug approval process. It was then that Frank
Burroughs was inspired to form the Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Alliance).4 In July
2003, this organization, along with conservative public
interest group the Washington Legal Foundation, brought a
suit against the FDA enjoining them from5 denying access to
experimental drugs for the terminally ill.
The administrative hurdle of drug approval, they
asserted, is in violation of their substantive due process
right to life as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. 6 The district court found that the FDA's policy7
was rationally related to a legitimate government interest
and, more significantly, the court did not find a
3. Erbitux was originally indicated for colorectal cancer and was not being
tested at that time for head and neck cancer. Since Abigail's death, Erbitux has
been approved for use in treatment for the type of squamous-cell carcinoma
which killed Abigail. See Susan Okie, Access before Approval-A Right to Take
Experimental Drugs?,355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 437, 438 (2006).
4. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, http://abigailalliance.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2008). For another tragic story, see Geeta
Anand, Saying No to Penelope, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, at Al.
5. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29594, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004). The Alliance
submitted a proposal to the FDA in January 2003 titled, In Re Tier 1 Initial
Approval Program,which would make drugs available at the earliest possible
stage of testing. Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance and the Washington
Legal Foundation to the Food and Drug Administration, In Re Tier 1 Initial
Approval Program to Expedite the Availability of Lifesaving Drugs (June 11,
2003). The access would be to drugs which have passed the Phase I safety
hurdle and have generated sufficient data to move on to Phase II studies. Id.
The failure of the FDA to respond within 180 days to the Citizen Petition
entitled the Alliance to judicial review. See McClellan, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
*4 n.2.
6. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
7. Id. at 475.

20081

AT THE AL TAR OF AUTONOMY

823

fundamental right and ultimately dismissed the case. 8 Yet,
in May 2006, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found in favor of the Alliance,
and remanded the case back to the district court to
determine whether or not the FDA's policy was narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.9
If a constitutional right had been found, this case would
have had profound implications for science, research, and
the regulation of the drug industry. However, the
underlying premise of this case-namely, that terminally ill
patients have an affirmative right to access early stage
drugs-was misguided. The role of the FDA is to protect the
nation's public health with regard to new drugs, and
inherent in this idea of public health is a sacrifice of some
individual liberties for the greater good. lo A fallout from
availability of post-Phase I drugs would be enormous, as
discussed below; this fallout would potentially affect
millions of Americans to their detriment as the clinical trial
system becomes compromised. More importantly, early
access cannot be justified on a public health model.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated its
May 2006 decision.11 Granting a motion on behalf of the
FDA, the court of appeals heard the case en banc on March
1, 2007, and on August 7, 2007, found in favor of the FDA, 12
resulting in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States. 13 On January 14, 2008, the United
States Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal; thus, the

8. Id. at 486. The district court did, however, find in favor of the Alliance

with respect to procedural and administrative issues. Id. at 472.
9. Id. at 486. The distinction between the different Phases will be discussed
infra Part I.A. The "compelling interest" test is a standard test for substantive
due process challenges once a fundamental right has been established. If a
fundamental right is not found, then the test is called the "rational basis" testthe burden is shifted to the party bringing the suit to show the government
action is unconstitutional. Historically, the government has been successful in
such disputes. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
10. See infra Part III.
11. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
12. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373
(2008).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (No. 07-444).
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court of appeal's decision will stand. 14 The Alliance has run
out of legal remedies. This case clearly posed one of the
most significant challenges to the FDA's regulatory
authority since United States v. Rutherford,15 and perhaps
paves the way for novel challenges to the FDA's authority
in the future.
This Comment will focus primarily on the legal and
philosophical arguments presented in the May 2006
decision, although some attempt will be made to sketch the
continuity between such arguments and the position of the
court in the FDA's August 2007 victory.
Part I of this Comment will lay out the regulatory
framework through which a new drug must travel in order
to be eligible for interstate commerce. Among the
regulations discussed will be the proposed Access,
Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act
(ACCESS) proposed by Senator Sam Brownback, as well as
current options available to the terminally ill for access to
drugs. 16 The fact that there are a number of options for the
terminally ill regarding access to experimental drugs may
make it difficult for a court to recognize a constitutional
violation on the part of the FDA. Part II will analyze the
substantive due process challenge that was before the court,
while Part III presents a public health perspective
regarding the tension between the need to protect the
public's health and the desire to protect individual liberties.
Part IV examines possible implications of a hypothetical
decision in the Alliance's favor. The repercussions of such a
decision would be varied and complex, and areas and issues
which may be touched by such repercussions run the gamut
from stem cell therapy, to commodification of organs, to the
14. Id. at 3379. 'The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition." Id.
15. 442 U.S. 544 (1979). After many years of complying with a federal
injunction to provide terminally ill cancer patients the experimental drug
Laetrile, the Supreme Court unanimously lifted the injunction from the FDA
holding "[t]he Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [FDCA] makes no special
provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients." Id. at 551. Many of the
arguments made in the Rutherford case are echoed in von Eschenbach. It would
be remiss to omit the fact that Laetrile never passed the Phase I safety hurdle.
It is in that very narrow sense that the current case is distinguishable from the
holding in Rutherford.
16. Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) introduced this legislation, supported
by the Alliance, which would create a three-tiered system to allow greater
access to experimental drugs. ACCESS Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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rights of the impoverished, and the right to access medical
marijuana.
I. REGULATORY BACKGROUND

A. The Approval Process
In 1938, Congress enacted the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to regulate the sale of manufactured
drugs. 17 A new drug cannot enter interstate commerce
without prior approval of the FDA.18 The FDCA requires
the FDA to prevent marketing of any drug or device where
potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not offset
by the possibility of therapeutic benefit. 19 However, if a
drug is intended for research purposes, Congress created an
exception. 20 Pursuant to its authority under the FDCA, the
FDA formulated rules to regulate the use of investigational
drugs. 21 In the later phases of drug testing, the FDA allows
pharmaceutical companies to sell specific drugs to those
individuals who happen to be in the most dire of situations
through "compassionate use" programs which consist
mainly of drugs in Phase III of testing-although access to
drugs in Phase II is possible. 22 The Phase system is at the
heart of the debate and is discussed further below.
The constitutional right the Alliance sought would
allow terminally ill patients to bypass the regulatory
approval process established by the FDA through the
powers given to it by Congress. 23 The United States' drug
approval process is one of the most strenuous and stringent
in the world; the average cost of bringing a drug from

17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
18. Id. § 355(a).
19. See id. §§ 301-399.
20. Id. § 355(i).
21. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20-.21 (2007).
22. See id. § 312.7(d). However, the manufacturers cannot make a profit.
They must only recover the costs of manufacturing the drug. Id. § 312.7(d)(3). In
addition, the drug company must be willing to supply the drug and the
physician must be willing to pursue an application for it. See id. § 312.7(d)(2).
This is due to the fact that the FDA prohibits commercial sale of investigational
new drugs. Id. § 312.7(b).
23. See ACCESS Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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preclinical tests to the pharmacy shelf is more than $800
million and takes about twelve years. 24 The FDA
prohibitions bar the introduction of new drugs into
interstate commerce until the FDA has approved a
sponsor's application. 25 The first step in bringing a new
drug to the market is the submission of an investigational
new drug application (IND).26 The IND must contain all of
the data from preclinical animal trials. 27 The preclinical
phase includes testing on different nonhuman animal
species in order to determine toxicity. 28 The questions
answered at this phase are rudimentary yet crucial: Is this
drug safe for testing on humans? How is this 29drug
metabolized? Will this drug negatively impact a fetus?
The IND application is a request for permission to test
the drug using human subjects. In order to survive the test
for safety and, eventually, for effectiveness, a drug must
survive three-and sometimes four-Phases. 30 Phase I
typically involves the introduction of an investigational new
drug into twenty to eighty subjects and is "designed to
determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the
[new] drug in humans, the side effects associated with
increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on
effectiveness. ' 31 The drugs at this stage of the process, at
the end of these trials, were the drugs that the Alliance was
seeking access to-drugs barely out of animal testing and,
as of yet, without any evidence of efficacy. No therapeutic
intent is required at this point. Phase II studies are
primarily concerned with effectiveness as well as "the
common short-term side effects and risks associated with
the drug. ' 32 It is in this phase that patients with a condition
24. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 153, 166 (2003).

25. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
26. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20-.23.
27. See id. § 312.23(a)(5)(ii)-(iv).
28. See id. § 312.22(c).
29. See id. § 312.23(a)(8).
30. Id. § 312.21.
31. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (citing 21 C.F.R. §
312.21(a)(1)).
32. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
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are being monitored and researched. There are usually
about one hundred to two hundred subjects at this point
and the lowest effective dose is given. 33 Efficacy is critical at
this juncture and roughly one-third of proposed drugs drop
out at the end of Phase II. Phase III studies generate
"additional information about effectiveness and safety that
is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-risk relationship of
the drug. '34 Thousands of subjects are enrolled during this
labor-intensive Phase. It is at this stage that the gold
standard of modern drug development takes place: the
randomized, controlled, double-blind clinical trials. 35
The FDA requires certain drugs (or devices) to go
through Phase IV (post-market) studies which "delineate
additional information about the drug's risks, benefits, and
optimal use."36 Finally, submission of a new drug
application (NDA) takes the formal step of asking the FDA
to consider a drug for marketing approval. 37 The NDA must
contain "full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and
whether such drug is effective in use."38 While it is not
necessary to establish a superiority of the proposed drug in
relation to already marketed drugs-as it must only
perform in accord with explicit claims 39-less than twenty
percent of proposed drugs actually survive and make it to
40
the pharmacy shelf.
B. The ACCESS Act
The Alliance has attempted to broaden their efforts
through legislative as well as judicial means. The proposed
ACCESS
Act
by
Senator
Brownback
is
quite
33. See id.
34. 21 C.F.R. §312.21(c).
35. See id. §§ 312.21(c), 314.126.
36. Id. § 312.85.
37. See id. § 314.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000).
39. See id.

40. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in New Drug Development: Approval
Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 297 (2001); Joseph A. DiMasi, Success Rates for New Drugs
Entering Clinical Testing in the United States, 58 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 1 (1995).
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revolutionary. 4 1 It seeks to amend section 506 of the FDCA
in order to reduce the time a drug can be released to those
in the most dire of situations. 42 The ACCESS Act would
allow a sponsor of an investigational drug to receive Tier I
or Tier II approval based on the results of a Phase I clinical
trial. 43 Sufficient evidence for this initial approval would
consist of enough safety data to support conduct of a Phase
II or III clinical trial, and initial evidence of effectiveness
patients who
based on care histories of a small number of
44
are unable to participate in the clinical trial.
Furthermore, this Act would rely on "clinical
evaluation, not statistical analysis."45 The Secretary of
Health and Human Services will have no later than thirty
days to either "approve the application or refer the application
to the Accelerated Approval Advisory Committee." 46 The
appeals process to the
ACCESS Act also provides for an
47
Drugs.
and
Food
of
Commissioner
Former FDA Associate Commissioner Peter J. Pitts
wrote to the Alliance with some trepidation regarding its
48
proposed changes as they existed in its Citizens' Petition.
He noted that the FDA's accelerated programs and the Tier
1 proposal had some features in common, but what made
them different was a source of great concern:
[T]he Tier 1 proposal gave "almost total weight" to early
availability and too little recognition to the other considerations... In
particular, making the drugs more widely available before much is
known about dosage and side effects would potentially subject
effects to the detriment to
patients to lethal doses and serious side
49
the patients' remaining quality of life.

41. ACCESS Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. (2005).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 3.
44. See id. § 3(a)-(c).
45. Id. § 3(b)(1)(B).
46. Id. § 3(b)(2)(A).
47. Id. § 3(b)(3).
48. See Brief for Appellee at 10, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drug v. Crawford, No. 04-5350 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
49. Id. at 10-11.
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C. ProgramsAlready in Place
As briefly indicated above, the FDA currently has a
number of programs specifically designed to accelerate the
development of new drugs for the seriously ill: Fast Track,
Accelerated Approval, and Priority Review.50 These programs
have their roots in the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1980s. Fast
Track is a process to generate expedited drug development,
rush the review of drugs used to treat serious diseases, and
fill an unmet medical need. 51 A drug that receives this
designation receives a number of benefits such as frequent
meetings and written correspondence with the FDA,
eligibility for accelerated approval, and rolling review (i.e.,
a manufacturer can submit sections of a NDA as it is
completed, rather than all at once). 52 Accelerated Approval
is approval of a drug based on a surrogate endpoint as
opposed to waiting for year after year to determine if there
has been a positive clinical outcome.5 3
Finally, Priority Review reduces the time spent in FDA
review to six months.5 4 However, the length of the clinical
trial period is not reduced, and the drug company must
make a request for the shortened review. 55 Studies show
that these FDA programs are succeeding in bringing drugs
to market in a timely fashion. 56 The illnesses combated by
those who benefit from expedited review include cancer,

50. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Fast Track, Accelerated Approval
and Priority Review, http://www.fda.gov/oashi/fast.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2008).
51. "[A]n unmet medical need is defined as providing a therapy where none
exists or providing a therapy which may be potentially superior to existing
therapy." Id. (emphasis omitted).
52. Id.
53. A surrogate endpoint is a laboratory indication such as shrinkage of a
tumor which "stands in" for a clinically meaningful outcome. Id. If it is
promising enough, the FDA considers it to be a likely prediction of future
results. Id.
54. There are two types of review: Standard Review and Priority Review. Id.
The former is used for drugs that offer only a minor improvement of existing
drugs, while Priority Review is for groundbreaking therapies that result in a
significant advantage over what is currently available in the marketplace. Id.
55. Id.
56. Since 1996, sixty-eight drugs have received this quickened review from
the FDA. Id.
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Hepatitis C, and HIV/AIDS. 57
The Alliance suggested in an early appellate brief that
the existing FDA policy which prohibits drug companies
from recovering more than simply the cost for investigational
drugs is impeding access for the terminally ill.58 The
financial disincentives for drug manufacturers is another
barrier to access as "there is no compelling interest that
could justify preventing those companies from earning a
modest and reasonable profit. That prohibition unfairly and
unduly limits terminally ill patients' access to medications
that might save their lives. ' 59 Under the proposed ACCESS
Act, drug sponsors would be permitted to make a profit on
the sale of Initial Approval drugs. 60

II. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE
Allegations of a violation of a liberty interest trigger a
substantive due process analysis. 61 The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "no person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. ' 62 Due process
claims are afforded a special and often difficult analysis.
The court must determine whether the asserted violation is
an affront to a fundamental
right which should be afforded
63
due process protection.
Here, the Alliance was asserting that mentally
competent, terminally ill patients have a constitutional
right to access post-Phase I drugs once all other treatment

57. A fascinating discussion on the roots of the rise of autonomy as an
ethical principle to be valued in research is found in BELMONT REVISITED:
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (James F. Childress,
Eric M. Meslin & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 2005).
58. Brief of Appellants at 18-19, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. Crawford, No. 04-5350 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
59. Id. at 19.
60. ACCESS Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). Once cost is involved,
economic disparities are inevitable. See infra Part III.D.
61. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
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options have been exhausted. 64 Judge Griffith, in his 2007
majority opinion, stated that the appropriate balance of
access and risk could be mediated by law, however, this
discussion was limited to "whether the Constitution
demands the balance they desire."6 5 Essentially, the
Alliance was attempting to infer the existence of new
constitutional rights from an analogy drawn with other
fundamental rights cases that have come before the
Supreme Court regarding liberty and privacy issuesspecifically those pertaining to medical decisions.6 6 The
discussion below fleshes out the analysis performed by the
court of appeals from its 2006 decision.
A. The Analysis
Previously, the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause 'guarantees more than fair process,"' 67 and
"accords substantive protection to the rights it guarantees. '68
Some rights are deemed fundamental and cannot be infringed
upon without the burden shifting to the government to
is narrowly tailored to serve a
show that the infringement
"compelling interest. '69
The primary challenge faced by the von Eschenbach
court was to determine whether a fundamental right was
implicated. There are two analytical approaches that
have been utilized by the Supreme Court to ascertain
which rights are-and which rights are not-deemed
"fundamental."70 Under the first approach, the Court will
64. Id. at 472.
65. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 710 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W.
3373 (2008).
66. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (quoting Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
68. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 475 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
69. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d at 486.
70. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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determine if a right is fundamental by assessing what
"personal dignity and autonomy" demand. 71 The second
approach frequently employed by the Supreme Court
involves an attempt to ascertain rights which are
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.' ' 72 These rights are such that they are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed. ' 73 The latter
analytical method has come to be known as the Glucksberg
analysis and this is precisely the method chosen in the von
Eschenbach case. 74 The concept and application of substantive
due process in general is quite controversial and the fullest
75
examination remains beyond the scope of this Comment.
Suffice it to say, judges are deeply concerned about creating
"new" fundamental rights ex nihilo, if you will, and express
the need for judicial restraint:
[W]e [the Supreme Court] ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand
the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decision lest the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause be subtly transformed
into the policy preferences of the
76
Members of this Court.

The 2006 von Eschenbach court effectively skirted the
approach of determining what "personal dignity and
autonomy" 77 demand, and focused on the more narrow

71. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
72. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 476 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503); see
also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
73. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 476-77 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
74. So named after the Supreme Court case Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997).
75. Much of the controversy in modern times surrounds the Supreme Court
decision of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which found a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual intimate relationships. See Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak its Name,
117 HARv. L. REV. 1893 (2004), for a thorough discussion of that case and the
implications for the substantive due process analysis after Lawrence.
76. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 502).
Glucksberg upheld a ban on assisted suicide.
77. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Other
fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court are the right to be free
from intrusion in the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" from Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), and the right to determine extended
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Glucksberg analysis as it is now called. 78
B. The Glucksberg Analysis
The Glucksberg analysis for a fundamental right is
79
considered to be the more restrictive of the two analyses.
To reiterate, this approach has two features: (1) the right
must be found to be 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition"'80 and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"'81 and (2) a 'careful description of the fundamental
liberty interest"' must be provided.8 2 The reasoning behind
this approach is to "ensure that courts do not multiply rights
without principled boundaries. '8 3 This careful description is
aiming for the most specific level of articulation of the
asserted right or violation.8 4 The court of appeals in the
2006 decision determined that the asserted liberty interest
on behalf of the Alliance "contains the careful description
we seek. '8 5 Once the careful description of a liberty interest
is ascertained, the question turns upon whether or not the
FDA's policies infringe on the protections guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause.8 6 Furthermore, if this liberty interest
is deemed fundamental, which the 2006 court of appeals
family living arrangements from Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503-05 (1977).
78. The 2006 court averted discussion of clinics, bedrooms, and wombs by
eliminating the "personal dignity and autonomy" approach. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d at 476-77.
79. Id. at 477. A nearly identical analysis is found in the 2007 opinion.
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008). For a
thorough discussion of the Glucksberg analysis, see Brian Hawkins, Note, The
Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105
MIcH. L. REV. 409 (2006).
80. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S.
at 503); see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
81. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 476-77 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at
721).
82. Id. at 477.
83. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 477 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-23).
84. The careful description concept was first introduced in Reno v.
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
85. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 478.
86. See id.

lores,
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has held that it is, the burden is placed on the FDA to
demonstrate that their policy is "'narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling [governmental] interest.' 87 In summation, the
2006 majority found that the Alliance satisfies the narrow
description requirement completely: "[tihe Alliance claims
neither an unfettered right of access to all new or
investigational new drugs nor a right to receive' 88treatment
from the government or at government expense.
Yet, there remains a question regarding the adequacy
of the first prong of the Glucksberg analysis. Perhaps the
Alliance articulated a careful description,8 9 but there has
not been a successful demonstration of the fundamental
right which is so "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' ' 90 such "that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed." 91 The 2006
majority inferred these rights from abstract concepts of
privacy, autonomy, and self-defense which is strictly
prohibited by Glucksberg.92 Furthermore, no circuit court
has found in favor of an affirmative access claim. 93 As the
Tenth Circuit held in Rutherford v. United States, the
FDA's regulatory policies do not offend ordered liberty or

87. Id. at 477 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 302).
88. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 478.
89. Serious doubts about the careful description claim were raised in the
2007 decision: '"We nonetheless have serious doubts about whether the

Alliance's description of its proposed constitutional right could ever pass
constitutional muster. The Alliance's claimed right depends on a regulatory
determination that the drug is safe for testing, prompting an obvious question:
How can a constitutional right be defined by an administrative regulation that
is subject to change?" Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W.
3373 (2008).
90. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (quoting Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
91. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 477 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
92. As the 2006 dissent notes, "[f]undamental rights may 'not [be] simply
deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy."' von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d at 491 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725).
93. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 496 n.6 (Griffith, J., dissenting). The court
cites Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1993), as instructive on this
point.
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the values of a free society. 94 Perhaps the early case of
Watson v. Maryland best summarizes the dissent's point
and serves as a transition to the discussion of the difficult
task of preserving individual liberties while protecting the
public's health:
It is too well settled to require discussion at this day that the
police power of the States extends to the regulation of certain
trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the
public health. There is perhaps no profession more properly open
to such regulation
than that which embraces the practitioners of
95
medicine.

As predicted by many scholars, the Alliance has not
proven that their claimed right is fundamental. This led to
the en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in 2007, that "the Alliance's claim of a right of
access to experimental
drugs is subject only to rational
basis scrutiny."96
III. PUBLIC HEALTH VERSUS INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
A. The Argument for Medical Necessity
In support of the affirmative right to self-preservation,
the 2006 majority constructed an analogy between the
plight of the terminally ill and the common law principle of
the necessity defense. 97 The right to self-preservation is so
primal that one need only look at how this concept
developed in classic tort law to recognize its weight. 98 When

94. Rutherford v. United States 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980).
95. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (quoted in von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d at 497 n.6).
96. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373
(2008).
97. A unique perspective on the concept of medical self-defense, and in
particular an argument in support of the Alliance, can be found in Eugene
Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, ProhibitedExperimental Therapies, and Payment
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007). See also 0. Carter Snead,
Unenumerated Rights and the Limits of Analogy: A Critique of the Right to
Medical Self-Defense, 121 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2007) for a critique and response to
Professor Volokh.
98. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 197 (1934).
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one is faced with impossible circumstances, the doctrine of
necessity can be invoked to justify acting in a way which is
not ordinarily considered appropriate or legal, a phenomenon
found sprinkled throughout Anglo-American law. 99 Acting
out of necessity to save oneself will often involve impinging
upon the rights of others. 0 0 Impinging on the rights of
others flies in the face of the traditional liberalism of a
Lockean or Millian variety, although this defense has
maintained its venerable reputation.' 0 ' However, the 2006
von Eschenbach majority misapplied the doctrine in this
case. The standard cases of necessity focus on the sacrifice
of personal property as opposed to the sacrifice of human
life. 10 2 Very few among us would argue that it is not
justifiable to sacrifice property-such as boats, vehicles,
etc.-when a human life is at stake. Yet, the case of The
Queen v. Dudley is instructive on this precise point. 103 This
case concerned a doomed voyage from Southampton,
England. During a storm, the ship capsized and the crew
was stranded at sea. 0 4 Due to starvation and unbearable
thirst, they planned, plotted, and seized upon the weakest
member of the crew and survived off of his flesh and
blood. 1°5 The men were, to their surprise, held accountable
for murder. 10 6 The defense of necessity did not justify the
taking of an innocent life.' 0 7 In other words, and perhaps
this point is missed by those close to the case, human lives
will be sacrificed with increased access to Phase I drugs
(either by reduced enrollment in clinical trials or toxicity of
the early stage drugs, for example).' 08 It is perhaps more

99. A classic example is Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
100. See The Queen v. Dudley, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, for one of the earliest
decisions on the necessity defense.
101. See generally George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered
from the Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975 (1999).
102. See, e.g., Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
103. The Queen v. Dudley, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
104. Id. at 273.
105. Id. at 279.
106. Id. at 288.
107. Id. at 287-88.
108. Ironically, the very spirit of human subject research is primarily
utilitarian in nature which presumes a sacrifice of a few for the greater good.
Yet, in this present case, the opposite holds: many will be sacrificed for the good
of a few.
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important to emphasize that the Alliance seeks access to
drugs which are experimental and therefore have not yet
been proven to be effective, much less necessary, for
survival. 109
In the 2007 decision, Judge Griffith, this time writing
for the majority, elaborated on the failed analogy of medical
self-defense. What Judge Griffith found most surprising
was the analogy that the Alliance attempted to forge
between the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence and
access to experimental drugs. 110 The Alliance argued, not
from a principle of privacy but, rather, that a woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy at any stage is permissible if
her life is in jeopardy."' The Alliance argued that this was
not a right based on privacy, but is "grounded in traditional
self-defense principles."' " 2 The analogy was that terminally
ill cancer patients are in a similar situation, i.e., they are in
immediate danger of succumbing to cancer and self-defense
principles-like those found in the abortion cases--can
justify access to "whatever medical means are necessary to
defend themselves." 113 However, Judge Griffith wrote that
"this analogy fails because this case is not about using
reasonable force to defend oneself."114 The Alliance was
asking for a constitutional right to assume "enormous
risks."115 This risk, at a very minimum, separates the
demands of the Alliance from the "life of the mother"
exception. 116 Once again, it is worth pointing out that access
to these drugs affects the clinical trial system which in turn
affects thousands of individuals. A woman's decision to
terminate a pregnancy is simply that-a decision between
one woman and one physician.
Finally, the tort principle of liability for interference
109. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373
(2008).
110. Id. at 709.
111. Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
112. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d at 709.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 710.
115. Id. The following point cannot be emphasized too much-these drugs
are potentially life saving. Remember, there is no efficacy and scarce safety data
when access is demanded.
116. Id.
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with the efforts to save a life appear to have been
misapplied. 117 The scholars of the Restatements likely
imagined individuals blocking rescue access at a local
swimming hole rather than a sea change to a federal
regulatory agency. Furthermore, the common law does not
impose a duty to rescue or preserve a life, unlike the
affirmative right the Alliance sought from the FDA. Indeed,
this is a crucial point of difference which substantially
weakens such an attempted argument by analogy.
Fundamental rights
cannot be inferred from common law
118
tort principles.
B. The Argument of Lack of Regulation
The 2006 von Eschenbach majority relied heavily on the
argument that governmental regulation of drugs is a
byproduct of modernity." 9 Contrast this with the idea that
the right to control one's own body is deeply rooted in our
nation's history.120 Prior to 1906 and the Pure Food and
Drug Act, 121 there were no regulations on the drug market.
After 1906, misbranded and adulterated foods or drugs
were prohibited from entering interstate commerce. 22 What
was not limited, however, was individual access to any and
all drugs (with the exception of narcotics). 123 However, in
1938, Congress enacted the FDCA12 4 in response to the

117. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 326 (1934).
118. It is interesting to note that the Court in Cruzan based a great deal of

its decision on a common law concept-that forced medical treatment is a legal
battery. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). However,
there is more consistency with the Nation's history and traditions for
recognizing the right to be free from battery than the right to access drugs out
of necessity. See id.
119. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
120. Id. at 480. Yet, as Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
demonstrates, that right to self-determination is not absolute. See also infra
Part III.C.
121. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768
(repealed 1938).
122. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 481.
123. Id. at 482. Narcotics were subject to the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914,
Pub. L. No. 223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
124. Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395).
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deaths of hundreds of individuals after they ingested Elixir
Sulfanilamide which at the time was sold as an
antibiotic. 125 The drug approval system was quite primitive
at this time, and "an NDA became automatically effective
within a time frame set by the FDA unless the FDA
determined that the drug
was unsafe and barred its
126
commercial distribution."'
Not until the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962127
did manufacturers have to provide empirical evidence of a
drug's efficacy.128 Safety was merely sufficient. 129 After
these amendments were passed, the drug industry was
effectively transformed, "[t]he Amendments authorized the
FDA to approve human clinical trials, regulate drug
advertising, inspect drug manufacturing facilities, and
promulgate good manufacturing practices... [and] required
drug manufacturers to disclose to the FDA any information
they received regarding the adverse consequences of
approved drugs.' 13 0 The majority inferred a right to be free
from regulation from the lack of federal regulation in this
131
area for most of our nation's history.
As Judge Griffith pointed out in his dissent from the
2006 decision, "the history of the FDCA does not demonstrate
a tradition protecting an individual's right to procure and
125. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 482.
126. Id. (citing James L. Zelenay, Jr., The PrescriptionDrug User Fee Act: Is
a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug
Administration?, 60 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 263-64 (2005)).
127. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-81).
128. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 482. Admittedly, efficacy has become a
controversial term. See Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information
Prescriptionfor Drug Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 569 (2006).
129. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments (or Drug Amendments) of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), were a reaction to the Thalidomide
crisis. Terrible birth defects were found in the children of mothers who ingested
Thalidomide to reduce morning sickness associated with pregnancy. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 482 (citation omitted).
130. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 482-83 (footnote omitted).
131. In fact, the dissent from 2006 traces a long history of attempts at drug
regulation and control from Colonial Virginia in the 1700s to the present. Id. at
494-95 (Griffith, J., dissenting). See also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008), for another detailed history of drug
regulation: 'We end our historical analysis where the Alliance would prefer it to
begin-with the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA."
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use experimental drugs; it only establishes that the federal
132
government has not always regulated experimental drugs."'
The dissent also astutely observed that to follow the logic of
the majority would place one in a precarious situation with
regard to medical marijuana and narcotics in general:
Because Congress did not significantly regulate marijuana until
relatively late in the constitutional day... there must be a tradition
of protecting marijuana use. Because Congress did not regulate
narcotics until 1866 when it heavily taxed opium, a drug created
long before our Nation's founding... it must be that individuals
13 3
have a right to acquire and use narcotics free from regulation.

Clearly, these arguments are tongue-in-cheek and were
intended to express a certain truth: "[t]he fact that the
Government has not always regulated a concern tells us
little about whether an individual has a constitutional right
to pursue that concern."'13 4 The efficacy of these arguments
carries over into the recent decision. Judge Griffith, this
time writing for the majority in the en banc decision, stated
that the Alliance cannot "override current FDA regulations
simply by insisting that
drugs... are safe enough for
35
terminally ill patients.' 1
The Alliance tried to argue that the prevalence of socalled "off-label" uses of prescription drugs is an indication
of inconsistent policies on behalf of the FDA. 136 However,
the FDA experienced its own crisis with this policy and has
37
taken rather strong measures to correct the situation.
The difference between the Tier 1 proposal and an off-label
prescription is striking. The drugs that are being prescribed
132. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Griffith, J., dissenting),
rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373
(2008).
133. Id. at 493-94 (internal citations omitted).
134. Id. at 494 (citation omitted).
135. von Eschenbach,495 F.3d at 705.
136. Off-label drug use is prescribing a drug for a use other than the one the

FDA approved.
137. The referenced crisis is a spike in pediatric suicide rates after providers
prescribed antidepressants off-label. Drug companies rarely tested their SSRIs
(selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) on the pediatric population, thus no
effective dosing information was available. Providers were often left guessing at
appropriate doses of these powerful drugs. What was most significant from this
crisis was the advent of the so-called "black box" warning on antidepressants.
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off-label have passed the requisite rigorous testing in order
to come to market. There is known data about these drugs
with regard to safety and effectiveness-although perhaps
not for the particular condition that it is being prescribed;
yet, it is not the black hole of post-Phase I either. Ironically,
the right the Alliance demanded actually applies more
appropriately to off-label use than to their own Tier 1
proposal. The FDA allows physicians to present information
at conferences and share their ideas regarding novel uses of
an already marketed drug. The physician then, in concert
with his or her patient, makes an informed recommendation
regarding a potential new use for a drug. This is the
intimate, one-on-one medical decision that is most analogous
to the rights secured in Roe v. Wade138 and Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health' 39-individual
medical decisions without global implications should generally
have constitutional protection. Conversely, individual
decisions with global repercussions should not be afforded
blanket constitutional protection.
C. The Jacobson Precedent
Parenspaetriaeis the name given to the police powers,
or paternal powers, of the state in order to effect public
health policies and regulations. 140 Our Constitution and the
democratic process support the government's mission to
protect and preserve the public's health. 14 1 Jacobson v.
Massachusetts142 is a landmark Supreme Court case outlining
the limits of individual autonomy. At the turn of the
century, Massachusetts gave municipal boards of health the
power to require vaccination of its inhabitants. 43 This
power was for the well-being of the public in the face of a
smallpox epidemic. Henning Jacobson refused the vaccine

138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
140. Seatbelt and helmet laws are often grouped under this category.
141. For one of the best introductions to the fundamental principles of

public health, see LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DuTY,
RESTRAINT (2000).

142. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (focusing on a due process challenge to a mandatory
smallpox vaccine).
143. GOSTIN, supra note 141, at 66.
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and
was fined five dollars. 44 The legal argument was that
"a compulsory
vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right
of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such
way as to him seems best."'145 However, the vaccination law
was upheld as an appropriate exercise of the state's police
power. 146 As Lawrence Gostin describes, "[Jacobson's] was a
classic claim in favor of a laissez-faire society and the
natural rights
of persons to bodily integrity and decisional
privacy."147
The Alliance was asserting a qualitatively identical
right to self-determination. 148 However, the Supreme Court
noted in its famed 1905 opinion that "the inherent right of
every freeman to care for his own body and health in such
way as to him seems best" is not "absolute."'149 The 2006 von
Eschenbach court heartily recognizes the limits of autonomy
by citing various turn of the century cases which stand for
the fundamental principle that "persons and property are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens"' 50 and
liberty could be sacrificed when it is essential "to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State."' 51
Nonetheless, the 2006 decision required further inquiry as
to the FDA's
countervailing interests which led to the
remand. 152

144. Id.
145. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
146. Id. at 27-33. As Gostin notes, this case is an anomaly of sorts
considering the libertarian bent of the Court during the Lochner era. GOSTIN,
supra note 141, at 346 n.31.
147. GOSTIN, supra note 141, at 66.
148. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695

(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
149. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
150. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 475; see also R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S.
465, 471 (1878); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890). It is not surprising
that the late nineteenth century was fertile ground for such cases. Between the
industrial revolution, immigration, and new epidemics, the individual
frequently found his/her liberty butting up against the need of the government
to protect the public's health. See generally GOSTIN, supra note 141.
151. Husen, 95 U.S. at 471.
152. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 486.
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D. Liberty, Autonomy, and the Kantian Perspective
John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty and Utilitarianism,
notes one of the essential principles that is absent from the
myopic vision of the Alliance. 153 One is free to make
decisions regarding his or her body until the point that it
affects others. The Alliance fails to recognize this principle:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant.... Over 154
himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign.

Mill's statement succinctly describes the tension in this
case specifically, and in the field of public health generally.
Each individual patient has the right to make personal,
intimate medical decisions which directly impact his own
body. 155 However, the ramifications of this case will affect
the health and medical outcomes of millions of Americans,
not to mention the implications that follow for other medical
liberties-such as the right to access marijuana for
medicinal purposes. 156 Individual autonomy is one value
among others and should perhaps not be placed at such
a
157
premium that could potentially seriously harm others.
In a sense, von Eschenbach was a natural outgrowth
of the patients' rights movement and the gradual shift from
medical paternalism to individual decision-making in that
realm. However, autonomy is never absolute, as demonstrated
in the Jacobson case, and the court should be mindful of the
delicate balance between a right to self-determination on an
individual basis and self-determination with populationwide repercussions.
153. JOHN
1993) (1859).

STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM

(Bantam Books

154. Id. at 12-13.

155. Of course, this was one of the arguments made by the terminally ill
individuals in Glucksberg. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997).
156. See infra Part IV.
157. ALFRED I. TAUBER, PATIENT AUTONOMY AND THE ETHICs OF RESPONSIBILITY

153 (2005) ("Although respecting autonomy is more important than biomedical
ethics had appreciated until the last two decades [1970s and 1980s], it is not the
only principle and should not be overvalued when it conflicts with other values."
(citation omitted)).
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The starting point of classical discussions of autonomy
originates with the thought of eighteenth century Prussian
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant often extols the virtues
of the supremely autonomous individual. It is through the
possession of rationality that a person manifests his or her
autonomy, and it is in that capacity as an autonomous,
rational individual that a person can truly act morally. The
Alliance was violating the spirit, at least by implication, of
Kantian ethics 158 which entails the famous maxim of "[s]o
act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in
that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as
159
means only."
The Alliance was not acting within this sense of
rationality because it was ultimately jeopardizing the
clinical trial system and, in a sense, not treating millions of
Americans as ends in themselves. Kantian ethics is
essentially duty-based as opposed to utilitarian. The latter
recognizes mere consequences as the sole basis for action,
whereas the Kantian operates from some sort of a priori or
universal principles governing human behavior. These
duties are to be universally true in every circumstance,
regardless of consequences, and often mirror traditional
Judeo-Christian maxims (never lie, cheat, murder, etc.). It
is through respecting our duties to others that we can be
considered rational beings. 160 The Alliance, from a Kantian
perspective, could not simply act for and in its own interest
at the risk of others-"as regards meritorious duties
towards others: the natural end which all men have in their
own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist,
although no one should contribute anything to the
happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally
withdraw anything from it .... -1161
IV. IMPLICATIONS

This following Part unpacks the consequences that
could have resulted from a decision in the Alliance's favor.
Amongst topics within the backlash are the threat to the
158. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF

MORALS (T.K. Abbott trans., 1988).
159. Id. at 58 (emphasis removed).
160. See id. at 59.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
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physician-patient relationship, the continued safety and
effectiveness of drugs, the protection of the vulnerable, and
the possibility of unlimited suits emerging from a new
fundamental right.
A. Primum non Nocere: FirstDo No Harm
One of the troubling implications which would have
followed from this new constitutional right concerns a possible
detrimental effect on the physician-patient relationship and
the informed consent process. This relationship is already
strained by the barrage of direct-to-consumer drug marketing.
Physicians feel compelled to satisfy their patients and
prescribe the drugs requested of them. Understandably, the
situation intensifies when the patient is terminally ill.
What happens to the informed consent process? In a
traditional consent process, risks and benefits are discussed
and options are weighed. 162 However, when a drug merely
passes the Phase I hurdle, which means it has been tested
on twenty to eighty patients while efficacy is unknown, the
consent process could be rendered inert.
The physician could be confronted with the ultimate
Faustian challenge-whether or not to dispense a drug with
an unknown safety profile, no published reports, and no
efficacy data. A commentator observed this tension: "calling
something lifesaving does not make it so" and that gone are
the days when a physician can say "medicine has nothing
more to offer." 163 It appears that, implicit in the desire to
enroll patients in early trials or to suggest experimental
drugs, there is a basic desire for the avoidance of failure. As
Matthew Miller, M.D., states, "choosing to participate [in
Phase I] trials may too often represent a turning away
from, rather than a reckoning with, the difficult reality that
16 4
a patient has exhausted all known therapeutic options.
This fear of brutal honesty is a further example of a
weakening of the physician-patient relationship.

162. The classic tort case regarding informed consent is Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
163. Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved

Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach [sic], 297 JAMA 205,
207 (2007).

164. Matthew Miller, Letter to the Editor, HASTINGS
2001, at 4, 5.

CENTER REP.
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The terminally ill as a group are considered a
vulnerable population which means they ought to be subject
165
to more protections than the average medical consumer.
Opening the pharmaceutical market to Phase I drugs
means charlatans will be abound to take advantage of the
less restrictive laws and the most vulnerable members of
our society. 166 This is a very real fear, as first noted by the
Rutherford Court:
Since the turn of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs have
advertised a wide variety of purportedly simple and painless cures
for cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs,
and ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of colored floodlamps;
tablets;
pastes made from glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral
167
and "Fountain of Youth" mixtures of spices, oil, and suet.

Furthermore, are these individuals capable of
consenting? 168 The sine qua non of ethical research is the
doctrine of informed consent. 169 Informed consent protects
and preserves the patient's autonomy in the following ways:
protecting privacy, maintaining welfare of participants, and
170
informing subjects of newfound risks or benefits.
However, a red flag rises when a patient is terminally illand possibly receiving strong pain medication for an
inoperable brain tumor, or undergoing extreme emotional

165. See, for example, the discussion found in GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC
CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2008). Other groups considered vulnerable
are children, prisoners, minorities, and pregnant women.
166. Interestingly, there are some who believe that there is a focus on too
much protection for the vulnerable-to their detriment, in fact. For a
fascinating-albeit controversial---discussion on the matter, see Rosamond Rhodes,
Rethinking Research Ethics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 7.
167. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1979).
168. Of course, the fact that one is terminally ill does not ipso facto imply
that he or she is incompetent.
169. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004), "informed

consent" is legally defined as "[a] patient's knowing choice about a medical
treatment or procedure, made after a physician or other healthcare provider
discloses whatever information a reasonably prudent provider in the medical
community would give to a patient regarding the risks involved in the proposed
treatment or procedure." For a thoughtful discussion on the nature and limits of
the informed consent process, see STEPHEN WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT
AuTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BENEFICENCE WITHIN HEALTH CARE (1998).

170. In the research context, the permission of withdrawal from a study is
an additional benefit of informed consent.
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and financial stress, for example. The patient's capacity 171
for consent should then be questioned. 172 Capacity includes
the ability to, at a bare minimum, "understand one's
diagnosis and crucial facts about one's treatment options,
such as their risks and prognoses;... to appreciate how those
facts apply to oneself;... and to reach and communicate a
decision in light of that understanding, appreciation, and
one's own values.' ' 73 However, without the data on efficacy,
how is consent even possible? How can a patient
appropriately weigh risks and benefits when risks are
unknown?
As previously discussed, the Cruzan decision delineated
the due process "right of a competent individual to refuse
medical treatment."'174 Yet, the Supreme Court never
discussed precisely what competence means. Similarly, the
Alliance never unpacked this tricky dual legal and medical
concept. As the dissent in the 2006 decision pointed out, the
Alliance desired to limit this new constitutional right to
patients who are "mentally competent" and who have
"informed access" to the experimental drugs. 75 Yet, "'with so
little data available, it is hard to understand how a patient
could be truly informed about the risks-or potential
benefits-associated with the drug." ' 176 Essentially, the
terminally ill patients were demanding a constitutional
right to make an ill-informed decision.
There is no legal precedent for that desired right. The
Court in Cruzan rejected the right to withdrawal or refuse
treatment if the individual is not competent to make the

171. Capacity is often a medical determination, whereas competence is a
legal determination.
172. See, e.g., Donna L. Berry et al., Informed Consent: Process and Ethical
Issues, 23 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 507 (1996); Gail A. Bujorian, Clinical Trials:

Patient Issues in the Decision-Making Process, 15 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 779,
779-83 (1988).
173. Adrienne M. Martin, Tales Publicly Allowed: Competence, Capacity,
and Religious Belief, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 33, 34 (emphasis
added).
174. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
175. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (Griffith, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (quoting the FDA's response to the Alliance's Tier 1 proposal).
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decision. 177 In fact, the Cruzan Court (this is a point the
2006 majority neglected to mention) allowed for state
governments to require clear and convincing evidence of an
individual's wishes, stating, "we conclude that a State may
apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings
where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and
hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent
vegetative state.' 178 The point here is that there are limits
on individual autonomy, even more so when the decisions
are a matter of life and death. The Cruzan Court found the
interests at stake to be so significant that the burden of
179
proof must be on those who wish to discontinue treatment.
This is so, if for no other reason than because, "[a]n
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment... is
not susceptible of correction."' 80 Furthermore, the Alliance
was seeking to infer a "right" from the ability to merely
"decide" whether or not to assume risks-known
or
11
unknown-from taking investigational drugs. 8
The strain on the physician-patient relationship would
be all the more exacerbated in this context. The role
between research and treatment would be blurred and
dangerous conflicts of interest could surface. 8 2 The treating
physician would now play the dual role of researcher and
entrepreneur, while the patient would morph into a
research subject and trial participant. 8 3 As Robert J. Wells
177. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-80. Interestingly, the right established in
Cruzan did not actually apply to the young woman at the heart of the
controversy, Nancy Cruzan. She was in a permanent vegetative state and thus
was incompetent to make the decision to have her feeding tube removed. Id. at
266. Furthermore, the family lacked "clear and convincing" evidence of Nancy's
wishes. Id. at 285.
178. Id. at 284.
179. Id. at 283.
180. Id.
181. For a concise discussion which outlines constitutional issues involved
with the end of life, see George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution-Choices
at Life's End, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 408 (2007).

182. Human subject research is governed by the "Common Rule," 45 C.F.R.
§ 46 (2007). The other influential ethical codes are the aforementioned Belmont
Report, The Declaration of Helsinki, and The Nuremberg Code of 1947. See also
Karen Gervais, The Ethical Foundationsof the Federal Regulations Governing
Human Subjects Research in the United States (Feb. 9, 2004) (unpublished
draft) (on file with Karen Gervais).
183. A thank you to Professor Sheila R. Shulman for first pointing out these
issues to me. The history of human subject research is filled with egregious
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of the Children's Hospital Medical Center observed,
"[t]herapeutic research, of which phase I clinical trials in
oncology is an example, is both therapy and research. It is
,,184
impossible to separate research from clinical care ....
Academic medicine is profoundly profitable for the
institutions they support and the pressure to publish is
palatable. If proof of efficacy is no longer required in order
to have access to a drug, medicine will be transported back
to the time of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study where no 'effort
[was] made8 to establish the efficacy of old forms of
treatment."'1 5
Another particularly problematic area is physician
liability. Would informed consent-whatever remains of
it-be enough to shield a physician from liability if the drug
is ultimately ineffective, unsafe, or both?18 6 Conversely, if a
physician does not inform a patient about experimental
therapies when standard therapy has failed, will he or she
be liable?
Therese M. Mulvey, M.D.,187 expressed deep concern
over the 2006 von Eschenbach decision and described the
wrongs and abuses, from Nazi Germany to the Tuskegee Study. In the modern

era, see, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst. Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
See also the infamous Jesse Gelsinger gene therapy study at the prestigious
University of Pennsylvania.
184. Robert J. Wells, Letter to the Editor, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb.
2001, at 4, 4. It is arguable that treatment without known efficacy can even be
deemed "therapeutic."
185. CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH
WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 42 (2005) (quoting JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE

2 (1981)). The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, which
spanned forty years and was sponsored by the United States Public Health
Service, left African Americans with untreated syphilis long after penicillin was
made available to cure the disease.
186. If these treatments are unsuccessful-which would be difficult, if not
impossible, to measure considering the patients are already terminal-then the
research will be considered "nontherapeutic" which brings along its own set of
liability issues. See, e.g., Clifton R. Gray, The "GreaterGood"... At What Cost?:
How Nontherapeutic Scientific Studies Can Now Create Viable Negligence
Claims in Maryland after Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 32 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1, 73-95 (2002).
187. Therese M. Mulvey, M.D., "is a community oncologist practicing in
Dorchester and Quincy, Massachusetts. She is immediate past president of the
Massachusetts Society of Clinical Oncologist, and also serves as Associate
Editor for the Journal of Oncology Practice." Therese M. Mulvey, Preserving
Evidence-Based Oncology: We Can't Jeopardize Clinical Trials, 2 J. ONCOLOGY
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT

PRAC. 204, 204 (2006).
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events following the decision:
Word about the Abigail Alliance decision spread rapidly over the
Internet.... and patients are pressing their oncologists to take
advantage of this new "opportunity." It is important that
oncologists be prepared to explain to their patients why such
access might not be
in their [best] interest, even if there are no
18 8
treatment options.

Significantly, nothing in the decision required the
pharmaceutical companies to provide the experimental
drugs or prescribe such treatments. In a similar vein, would
the pharmaceutical companies be held liable for adverse
outcomes? 8 9 The proposed ACCESS Act explicitly mentions
a provision for "a written waiver of the right to sue the
manufacturer or sponsor of the drug, biological product, or
device, or the physicians who prescribed the product or the
institution where it was administered, for an adverse event
caused by the product, which shall be binding in every
State and Federal court."' 190
B. A Threat to FDA Authority
According to the FDA's mission statement, the FDA
"is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary
drugs."'191 The country as a whole is not benefited by the
FDA qua agency being portrayed as an evil gatekeeper
determined to keep all the "magic" cures to itself. There is
solid legal doctrine whereby the courts defer to agency
decisions. 192 Yet, if a fundamental right concerning access
to these drugs is granted, the regulatory power of the FDA
may very well fall prey to paralysis and eventual erosion of
188. Id.
189. See Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006).
190. ACCESS Act, S. 1956, 109th Cong. § 5(B)(ii) (2005).
191. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA's Mission Statement,
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2008).
192. The classic case on the matter is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). The two part Chevron analysis is
used to determine whether agency action is arbitrary and capricious: (1) Has
Congress specifically spoken to the question at issue?; (2) If Congress has been
silent on the issue, then the Court must determine whether the agency's
construction of the statute in question is permissible. Id. at 842-43.
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effective power, with no clear end to such erosion in sight.
Some suggest that what is really at the heart of this
conundrum is the long-standing tension involved in the
question of what would constitute the best approach to the
193
pharmaceutical industry-free market or regulation.
Perhaps it is an anathema to American sensibilities to
obstruct the way to lifesaving treatments; yet, the Laetrile
debacle, if anything, demonstrated the critical role of the
FDA in protecting the public health. If the pharmaceutical
industry is deregulated, who would protect patients from
experimental therapies? How would the face of direct-toconsumer advertising look after deregulation?
As Lawrence 0. Gostin aptly noted, "Justice Harlan, in
Jacobson, insisted that police powers must be based on the
'necessity of the case' and could not be exercised in 'an
arbitrary, unreasonable manner' or go 'beyond what was
reasonably required for the safety of the public."' 194 It is fair
to say that the FDA is exercising its authority in a manner
consistent with the spirit of the Jacobson decision. Their
policies are rooted firmly in established science and are
indeed required for public safety. Judge Griffith echoes that
sentiment in the August 2007 opinion: "The Alliance's
arguments about morality, quality of life, and acceptable
levels of medical risk are certainly ones that can be aired in
the democratic branches, without injecting the courts into
unknown questions of science and medicine."'195
C. Clinical Implications
On the clinical side, many cancer organizations,
scientists, and physicians came out against the proposals
put forth by the Alliance.' 96 The clinical trial system was at

193. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008). Although it is an area

ripe for analysis, the economic implications of the von Eschenbach decision (as
well as implications concerning judicial activism) are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
194. GoSTIN, supra note 141, at 68 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 28 (1905)).
195. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 714, cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008) (emphasis
added).
196. The Patient Representatives to Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee
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stake; and in a country where evidence-based medicine is
the gold standard, the entire process of drug development
becomes threatened without these placebo trials. Why
would desperately sick people want to take the chance of
receiving a placebo in a Phase II study when they could

receive "treatment" from Phase

J?197

This is what concerned

Ms. Fran Visco, President of the National Breast Cancer
Coalition (NBCC). She, among others, expressed extraordinary concern regarding the Alliance's Tier 1 proposals:
Public policy should discourage access to investigational drugs
outside of clinical trials. Investigational treatments made outside
of clinical trials have the potential to undermine the clinical trial
system. There is little incentive for a patient to participate in a
clinical trial if she can obtain the investigational drug outside of
the trial. This makes trial accrual difficult, and may significantly
undermine the ability of the investigators to determine the efficacy
and safety of the intervention. That was certainly the case with
bone marrow transplant for breast cancer - because it was so
widely available outside of clinical trials it was extremely difficult
to accrue patients to trials, and it took many years longer than it
should have to learn that the high-risk and expensive
procedure
19 8
provides no benefit to women with breast cancer.

There is potential for public confusion regarding the
issue of which drug is most safe and effective and how this
drug may be best obtained. Karl Schwartz, patient consultant
to the FDA and President of Patients Against Lymphoma,
sounded off on the downside to a reduction in regulatory
authority and standards in general: "[The Tier 1 proposal]
can undermine the public confidence in marketed drugs....
For example, if three new therapies gain Tier 1 approval for
a condition, which of these is best, safest, or most
dangerous?"199
"states that the Tier 1 program would 'likely .

.

. cause harm not only to

patients, but also to the entire drug development program."' Brief of Appellee,
supra note 48, at 11 n.5.
197. Phase I trials would not have been eliminated if the Alliance had
prevailed, although one might have been faced with a danger of enrollment
suffering.
198. Letter from Fran Visco, President, National Breast Cancer Coalition to
Mark McClellan, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Sept. 9, 2003)
(Docket No. 2003P-0274/CP1).
199. Letter from Karl Schwartz, Patient Consultant to the FDA to Mark
McClellan, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Sept. 9, 2003)
(Docket No. 2003P-0274/CP1).
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Furthermore, Mr. Schwartz claimed:
There will be increased risks to patients using Tier 1 approved
drugs. Statistically, most drugs that complete Phase I will be
judged not suitable for approval. Adding to the risks for patients
would be that treating physicians, instead of trained investigators,
would monitor patients receiving new and poorly-characterized
drugs in local centers, perhaps without adequate resources and
200
time.

Mr. Schwartz did recognize, along with the Alliance's
founder, Frank Burroughs, that although the compassionate
use programs are far from ideal and in need of some kind of
effective revamping,201Tier I access was not itself the
appropriate solution.
D. A Right to Noninterference?
The 2006 majority opinion in von Eschenbach did not
follow its decision through to its logical conclusion, as Judge
Griffith noted in his dissent. 20 2 For example, he asked, why
wouldn't the majority's reasoning apply to the seriously
ill?203 Those with debilitating chronic diseases are no less
likely to want access as soon as possible in order to have
relief. Someone with a chronic pain condition such as
fibromyalgia, may be as desperate for relief as a terminally
ill cancer patient.
Among those individuals seeking relief are those who
desire access to medical marijuana. 20 4 The von Eschenbach
majority did not express any concern over the floodgates
opening to new medical marijuana litigation. 205 However,

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Griffith, J., dissenting),
rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373

(2008).
203. Id. at 499. Furthermore, the FDA bans importing drugs from Canada
which assuredly restricts some individuals' access to drugs. Perhaps that will be
the next due process challenge brought before the court.
204. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
205. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
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Angel Raich, the woman who brought the unsuccessful
Commerce Clause action against Congress' authority to
regulate marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA), now brought suit against the Drug Enforcement
Administration challenging206the CSA as a violation of her
right to medical treatment.
A "negative right" is, for example, the right to pursue a
course of treatment between you and your provider without
interference from the government. 20 7 Access to medical
marijuana, abortions, and contraception all fall within the
general rubric of negative rights. Simply stated, there is not
a fundamental right to medical decision making as a
separate category free from government interference. At the
risk of a wholesale rejection of the private physician-patient
relationship, the Alliance should have realized that there is
applicable precedent establishing this proposition. This
precedent, the 2007 court pointed out, could be found within
20 8
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.
That case involved an argument of medical necessity that is
similar to the argumentation found in von Eschenbach. The
patients in Oakland sought access to marijuana for
medicinal purposes and invoked an argument based on
medical necessity. The Supreme Court held that "[u]nder
any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear: The
defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made
a determination of values. '209 Analogously, the FDA already
determined that access to experimental drugs should be
greatly truncated. 210 Essentially, the preservation of life,
which is what the Alliance was seeking, "[c]annot justify a
blanket right to obtain without any government interference
every and any kind of treatment that might be available

206. A concise article on the matter is John A. Robertson, Controversial
Medical Treatment and the Right to Health Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-

Dec. 2006, at 15, 18; see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007).
Angel Raich has not been successful in her appeal.
207. Contrast negative rights with positive rights, such as the claim that there

is a universal right to healthcare.
208. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
209. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001)), cert. denied, 76
U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).
210. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).

2008]

AT THE AL TAR OFAUTONOMY

855

and that a physician might recommend. 211
Another arena that may become ripe for judicial
intervention is embryonic stem cell therapy, as scholar
John Robertson observed. 212 Controversial in and of itself, a
new constitutional right to have access to life-preserving
drugs could have opened the floodgate with regard 2to
13
challenges to federal laws prohibiting such therapies.
Opponents of embryonic stem cell treatments might have
demanded a ban against public (i.e., Medicare or Medicaid)
214
funding for such therapy. Such is the case with abortion.
This, of course, will directly affect the poorest members of
society, those who are unable to pay for the treatments. So,
we would have a new fundamental right to access, yet a
vast pool of individuals who would be too poor to pay for it.
A subtle (or perhaps not so subtle) class system would then
arise between those who could pay for Phase I therapies
and those who could not.
This parallels a concern of the National Organization
for Rare Disorders (NORD). NORD is an extremely active
patient advocacy group whose efforts led to the creation of
the Orphan Drug Act. 215 The recent proposals by the FDA
(sparred by the von Eschenbach suit as well as the proposed
ACCESS Act) to allow companies to charge more for the
unapproved drugs could "cause a class struggle with
enormous political repercussions" due to the fact that
insurance companies will not pay for investigational drugs
and so, only those who can pay out of pocket will actually
receive access. As Therese M. Mulvey, M.D., notes, "[i]t is
not difficult to imagine that payers might offer substantial
resistance to covering costly cancer drugs-for either
labeled or off-label uses-if they begin to be approved on
the basis of no show of efficacy and little if any show of
211. N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1390 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
212. Robertson, supra note 206, at 18-19. Although embryonic stem cell
therapy is not currently a standard treatment for anyone, Phase I trials are
predicted to begin within the next year or two. Under the von Eschenbach
principle, there could be challenges to access these treatments. Id. at 18.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
215. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 94-414, § 526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
The Orphan Drug Act provides incentives to pharmaceutical companies to fund
research and development for drugs which affect less than 200,000 individuals.

Id. § 1(b).
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2 16

safety."
Furthermore, NORD argues--contra the Alliance-that
access should not be given at the end of Phase I. NORD is
sensitive to the fact that companies already struggle to
enroll volunteers. The ideal proposal, in fact, would be to
forbid access until the end of Phase II testing, "[t]he data
from Phase II trials must be compelling before access is
allowed... [or] Phase II trials should be fully enrolled or
completed before broader access is permitted, and only if
relative safety and effectiveness is probable. ' 2 17 Another
issue that has arisen with respect to this case is that NORD
believes the FDA has favored patients with cancer and
HIV/AIDS, neglecting those with rare and other lifethreatening diseases. NORD's complaints point to real
problems concerning access to Phase I drugs and provide
possible fuel for future litigation on the part of those who
are at an economic disadvantage or those who just might
not have the "disease of the moment. '2 18
If there had been, in fact, a decision in favor of the
Alliance, then we might have occasion to discuss any relevance
such a decision would have with respect to issues concerning
the organ market. 2 19 It is common knowledge that many
individuals cannot pay for organ procurement and many die
each year while waiting for the necessary transplants. 22 0
The organ donation system in our country is largely altruistic,
and, thus, thousands of people are left quite helpless in the
face of a necessary reliance upon the kindness of strangers.
If a fundamental right had, in fact, been established in
von Eschenbach, a constitutional challenge could be brought
against the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA)
as an interference with a right to preserve life. Specifically,
if people were permitted to sell their organs, many lives
would inevitably be saved (as a transplant would presumably
be quite preferable to dialysis in the case of kidney failure,

216. Mulvey, supra note 187, at 204.

217. Letter from Abbey S. Meyers, President of the National Organization
for Rare Disorders to the Food and Drug Administration Division of Docket
Management (Jan. 12, 2007) (Docket No. 2006N-0062).
218. Id.
219. Robertson, supra note 206, at 19.
220. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) makes it a federal
crime to pay for organ donation. Id.
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for example). 221 The government would be forced into a
position of showing that the ban on selling organs is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest. 222 It would appear
that those reasons are self-evident (e.g., averting a global
organ market, prevention of the exploitation of the poor, and
the commodification of persons). Yet many perceived the logic
behind the FDA regulations as similarly self-evident. Now
those very regulations designed to protect and preserve the
public health and the public safety have been challenged as
an interference with individual liberty. The negative right to
healthcare could be stretched to accommodate the autonomy
of a statistically small sample to the detriment of the many.
CONCLUSION

If a right to noninterference by the government was upheld
in von Eschenbach, the courts could become overburdened with
similar cases stemming from the principles, and thus
precedent, established by that case. The courts, rather than
the agency which was given authority by Congress to
regulate the pharmaceutical industry, would become the
arbiters of emerging medical technologies. With the clinical
trial system weakened, millions of Americans would feel the
impact of such a decline. As a society, there cannot be complete
reverence to the individual right of self-determination to
the detriment of an entire population-there must be a
balance. The fear expressed by researchers and scientists
alike regarding the potential damage to the clinical trial
system is real and impending. The FDA is working with
lawmakers to revise and improve its access system, and
that is precisely where this debate ought to be held-the
halls of Congress and not the Supreme Court. As Judge
Griffith stated in the August 2007 opinion, "[o]ur holding
today ensures that this debate among the Alliance, the
the
FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and
'223
public may continue through the democratic process.

221. Robertson rightly observes that the law is inconsistent with respect to
the buying and selling of body parts. For instance, a woman can sell her eggs to
an infertile couple, but she is barred from selling them to a researcher.
Robertson, supranote 206, at 19.
222. An interesting discussion surrounding the consequences of an organ
trade can be found in MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).
223. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2008).

